Culture and Cooperation

Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (American Sociological Review 2000, pp. 19-51)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities.human cooperation, punishment, culture, experimental public good games

Social comparison in the workplace: evidence from a field experiment

We conducted a randomized field experiment to examine how workers respond to wage cuts, and whether their response depends on the wages paid to coworkers. Workers were assigned to teams of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performance‐independent hourly wage. Cutting both team members’ wages caused a substantial decrease in performance. When only one team member’s wage was cut, the performance decrease for the workers who received the cut was more than twice as large as the individual performance decrease when both workers’ wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison processes among workers affect effort provision because the only difference between the two wage cut conditions is the other team member’s wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their team member’s pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers’ wages remained unchanged, indicating that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort.Compensation, fairness, field experiment, social comparison

Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members? investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.Laboratory experiments, Rent-seeking, Conflict, Group competitiveness

How Does Communicating Herd Immunity Affect Immunization Intentions?

While previous studies have shown that communicating herd immunity can increase immunization intentions, it is unclear how the definition of the beneficiaries influences intentions. In a vignette study, using a new hypothetical influenza virus, 4,172 participants from five European countries (Bulgaria, N=873; Denmark, N=896; England, N=873; Estonia, N=916; and Italy, N=745) were randomized to one of three experimental conditions: (1) control (no mention of herd immunity), (2) society (social benefit of immunization for overall society mentioned), and (3) friends (social benefit for friends and family members mentioned). While the study did not find that communicating herd immunity influenced overall immunization intentions across the five countries, it found substantial cross-country differences in the effect of the communication. In England, friends increased intentions, while society increased intentions in Denmark but decreased it in Italy. While communicating the social benefit of immunization can influence intentions, its contrasting effects highlight the importance of empirically testing

Disturbance, predation and competition in a flood-prone stream

Among the drivers of the patchy distribution of organisms in space and time are abiotic factors, including physical disturbance, and biotic interactions such as predation and competition. Our understanding of the interplay of these factors is far from complete, especially in frequently disturbed ecosystems. The first of three main experiments investigated the individual and combined effects of flood disturbance and fish predation on benthic invertebrates, algae and leaf decay rates in a reach of the flood-prone Kauru River in Otago, New Zealand. Bed movements during a mid-sized flood were simulated by removing substratum from 16 scour patches, depositing substratum in 16 fill patches, and leaving 16 stable patches unchanged (patch size 0.49m2). Fish were excluded from half the patches using electric exclosures. (My first data chapter describes how this method was adapted for use in the Kauru.) The community on ceramic tiles was studied for 58 days. Local bed disturbance had many short-term and long-term effects on invertebrate and algal biomass distributions. Fish presence had far fewer effects but four of six significant interactions between disturbance and predation indicated a stronger impact of predation in stable patches. I included competition among invertebrate grazers as a third factor in my second 43- day experiment in the Kauru River. The competition treatment consisted of twice-weekly removals of Potamopyrgus antipodarum from half the patches. Local bed disturbance affected the benthic community far more often than fish predation or snail grazing. The frequency of disturbance effects was highest shortly after the disturbance and decreased with time, whereas the few effects of biotic factors occurred on the last sampling date. In my final experiment, I used streamside channels to investigate two topics not addressed in the reach-scale experiments. First, predatory fish are known to influence stream invertebrates not only by direct consumption, but also by altering their behaviour. Second, different fish predators can affect prey communities in different ways. I investigated the individual and combined effects of flood-related bed disturbance and predation by two dominant fish species. Bed movements caused by floods were simulated by tumbling the substratum in half the channels at the start of the experiment. Six channels each were stocked with trout or upland bullies or had fish excluded. Biological response parameters were determined 0, 14 and 28 days after the disturbance, and invertebrates in the entire channel substrata on day 28. Disturbance frequently affected a range of response parameters. Presence or absence of predatory fish, by contrast, had no significant effects on overall invertebrate standing stocks but affected invertebrate densities on surface stones in 40% of cases and invertebrate activity on surface stones in all cases. Native bullies featured more often than exotic trout in causing density changes and equally often in causing changes to grazer behaviour. My combined experimental findings from a flood-prone river imply that in the presence of physical disturbance, biotic interactions may play a weaker role in determining the distribution of stream organisms than under stable conditions

Applying Behavioural Science to EU Policy-Making

This report offers a brief introduction to behavioural science and its application in an EU policy context. It explains what needs to be taken into consideration when applying behavioural science to policy. It stresses the need to identify the behavioural element of a policy and select the appropriate method of research. The report also provides illustrations of how behavioural science has been applied in the past and offers practical recommendations for designing behavioural studies.JRC.J.3-Information Societ

Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game

In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems

Testing temporal frames of colorectal cancer risks: evidence from randomized online experiments

Low perceived risk of is associated with a low probability of engaging in risk preventive behaviours. Temporal framing has been suggested to make the risk seem higher, as narrower time frames appear to increase perceived risk and intentions to engage in risk-preventive behaviours. In two online experiments, we tested how manipulating risk information about colorectal cancer (CRC) influenced risk perception and preventive behaviours. 902 men and women aged 45–54 were recruited from an English online panel. Study 1 (N = 132) investigated how communicating CRC mortality instead of incidence rates influences risk perception, using both yearly and daily frames. In study 2 (N = 770), CRC incidence was described as occurring yearly, daily or hourly. The primary outcome measures were risk perception, intention to engage in preventive behaviours and whether participants chose to read information about ways to reduce CRC risk or skip it to finish the survey. Study 1 did not find a difference in intentions based on information about the risk of developing vs the risk of dying of CRC. Study 2 found that, while communicating CRC incidence occurring as every day increased information-seeking behaviour compared to every year and every hour (57.4% vs 45.9% vs 45.6%, p = 0.012), individuals in the daily condition were less likely to get all comprehension questions right (69.9% vs 78.2% vs 85.0%, respectively, p = 0.015). Temporal framing had no impact on perceived risk or intentions to engage in risk-reducing behaviours. While manipulating risk information in terms of temporal framing did not increase perceived risk, it may influence people’s decision to engage with the information in the first place

Effectiveness of behavioural economics-based interventions to improve colorectal cancer screening participation: A rapid systematic review of randomised controlled trials

• We searched PubMed, PsycInfo and EconLit for RCTs that evaluated BE interventions in CRC screening. • We identified 1027 papers for title and abstract review. 30 studies were eligible for the review. • The most frequently tested BE intervention was incentives, followed by default principle and salience. • Default-based interventions were most likely to be effective. Incentives had mixed evidence. • BE remains a promising field of interest in relation to influencing CRC screening behaviours